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Abstract
The rules laid down in Article 32 of the Protocol No. 18 on the Statute of the
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank of the
Maastricht Treaty will significantly redistribute European seignorage income
and hence the implicit entitlement to the  € 352 billion stock of interest bearing
assets which the central banks contributed to the currency union as of 1 January
1999. According to current plans, the redistribution will start by 1 January 2002.
In terms of wealth equivalents and anticipating the Greek participation, Germany
will lose € 30 billion (or 59 billion deutschmarks) and France will gain € 31 billion
(or 202 billion French francs). Portugal will gain   € 3.9 billion (or 792 billion
escudos) and Spain will lose  € 11 billion (or 1 879 billion pesetas). In per capita
terms, Luxembourg, Finland and France will be the main winners with gains of
€ 1 309,  € 627 and  € 527, respectively, whereas a German will lose € 366 and
a Spaniard  € 287. The paper argues that this redistribution was not intended by
the signing parties and recommends a revision of  the Maastricht Treaty to
correct the mistake.
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Introduction
The European Monetary Union (EMU) socialises not only the good will and esteem that the
national currencies have acquired but also the seignorage profit which the central banks earn
by lending their money to the private sector at the market rate of interest. Throughout their
histories central banks have accumulated interest-bearing assets step by step with the
expansion of their respective monetary base which has followed the development of the
economy. These assets, which total about  € 350 billion in the euro-11 countries, are stocks of
“historic” seignorage wealth, which will generate an eternal, annual stream of returns that will
help finance government budgets. By 1 January 2002, the seignorage wealth of participating
countries will be brought into, and socialised by, the currency union.
The socialisation of historic seignorage wealth will not occur in a legal sense, since only
the future interest income generated by this wealth will be pooled and redistributed. The
national central banks remain the legal owners of the assets backing the monetary base.
However, from an economic point of view, the eternal socialisation of an asset’s return is the
same as the socialisation of the asset itself. Thus, in economic terms, there will indeed be a
once and for all socialisation of current central bank assets in about a year from now.
The socialisation involves an effective net redistribution among the participating
countries because the interest income received by a country may differ from what this country
contributes. A country’s share in the interest contribution to the pool depends on its share in
the joint monetary base. However, the share in the interest received from the pool is given by
the average of this country’s population and GDP shares. A country whose monetary base at
the start of the currency union was large relative to its size as measured by these two indicators
will lose, and a country whose monetary base was relatively small will gain. A losing country
could be one whose currency is widely used outside its own borders or one whose black
market activities imply an unusually large usage of cash payments. This was noted in
Remsperger (1996) and studied extensively in Sinn and Feist (1997) and Gros (1998). Not
knowing precisely which countries would eventually participate in the currency union and what- 3 -
the stock of seignorage wealth would be at the start of this union, Sinn and Feist estimated
gains and losses of up to € 34 billion per country.
The redistribution of historic seignorage wealth is implied, though not openly spelled
out, by Article 32 of the Protocol No. 18 (ex No. 3) on the Statute of the European System of
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (ECB) of the Maastricht Treaty. It seems
fair to say that it was not understood and foreseen by the parties signing the treaty. It was only
after the above-mentioned publications that politicians realised what they had signed, and the
reaction was to postpone the beginning of the redistribution process by three years to clarify
the matter. In 1998 the Governing Council of the ECB decided not to start the five-year
transition period envisaged in Article 51 with the establishment of the currency union as of
1 January 1999. According to Article 32.3, transitional provisions were agreed on which are
discussed in more detail below, but which in effect postpone the start of the redistribution
process to 1 January 2002. There is no agreement yet on exact and final provisions concerning
the redistribution process. The discussions about these rules are receiving new momentum right
now, in the autumn of 2000, and thus it seems useful to reconsider the matter.
The Scope of the Study
The Bundesbank (2000, p. 13) was recently asked how much the introduction of the euro will
cost the taxpayer. This is a simple, but far reaching question which we do not dare to answer,
because we would then have to forecast the future monetary development of the countries with
and without the currency union. Here we try to answer a more limited question which becomes
clear if three categories of seignorage wealth are considered.1
(1) Historic seignorage wealth built up before 1 January 1999.
                                                
1 The calculations presented in this paper refer to wealth equivalents of long-term seignorage gains or
losses, but not with the actual flows of transfers among the national central banks once EMU has begun.
Predicting these flows would be meaningless since national moneys cease to exist. Given that with the
euro, all central banks are able to produce the same quality of money, part of the German currency might
well be issued in Portugal and vice versa. This will affect the net flows of payments between the central
banks but not the gains and losses calculated here, which are all measured relative to the situation without
EMU.- 4 -
(2) The present value of increments in seignorage wealth that would have been built up by
the single countries after 1 January 1999, had there not been a currency union.
(3) The present value of additional increments in seignorage wealth, if any, that will be
generated after 1 January 1999, when the euro is more widely used outside Europe
than the sum of the national currencies would have been without the currency union.
To answer the Bundesbank’s question a country’s distributional gains and losses over all three
of these categories would have to be netted out. However, this is close to impossible since the
required data are not available: partly because the analysis involved would be counterfactual,
partly because the lack of knowledge about the euro’s future. In this article we will therefore
confine our attention to category (1) only and try to find out how the distribution of historic
seignorage wealth will be affected by the currency union.
There are two reasons for this limitation of scope. Firstly, we want to produce cautious
and unambiguous estimates of the redistributive wealth effects in order not to dramatise the
issue. The figures under (2) could be much larger in present value terms than those calculated
under (1), but under the assumption of identical growth rates of the national monetary bases
they would just blow them up proportionately.2
Secondly, even if a country’s gains under category (3) overcompensate any losses
under (1) and/or (2), it is not clear that they legitimate such losses. It could well be argued that
the extra increment in seignorage wealth, if any, which is due to the success of the euro should
be distributed equally among the participating Europeans. That some Europeans gain more
from the euro than others because they also gain from the socialisation of interest bearing
assets the others possessed before the euro was introduced will be hard to understand for
many tax payers.
                                                
2 Let  i  denote the common interest rate and  r  the common growth rate of the monetary base. Then the
net gain or net loss of a country from category (2) is, in present value terms,  r / (i–r)  times the respective
figure calculated for category (1), whatever that may be. If, say, r=4%  and  i=6%, then the factor is 2; i.e.
the net gain or loss from categories (1) and (2) taken together is three times the figure we report in this
article. This was pointed out by Wenger (1997) in a response to Sinn (1997).- 5 -
 Apart from that it is by no means clear that there will be gains of type (3). Currently,
the  euro suffers from a flight of money holders outside the EU-11 countries from the
deutschmark into the dollar, which amounts to a huge destruction of European seignorage
wealth. The flight can probably be attributed to the three year delay between the
announcement of the abolishment of the deutschmark and introduction of the new currency.
Whether it will be reversed when the new bank notes arrive remains to be seen.
The novelty of this article relative to the previous literature is threefold. Firstly, it will
offer redistributive figures that are calculated on the basis of the official final balance sheets of
the countries introducing the euro rather than on estimates about these balance sheets.
Secondly, it can use the knowledge of who actually participates in the euro, a question which
was not clear when the original calculations were made. Thirdly, it will calculate the
incremental redistributive effects of the countries that may join the EMU in the future.
Seignorage Wealth and Country Size
It is not easy to understand why central bank money is seignorage wealth, because accounting
practices blur the picture. The currency issued by a central bank is listed on the liability side of
its balance sheet, and the assets obtained in exchange for the currency are listed on the asset
side. From an accounting perspective, money creation does not generate wealth with a central
bank, because both sides of the bank’s balance sheet grow simultaneously without generating
any differential equity capital. Indeed, this accounting custom may be the reason why the
signing parties did not really understand that they were redistributing existing wealth when they
founded the currency union.
However, the point is that, in general, the central bank does not pay interest on the
currency it issued while it collects interest on the assets obtained in exchange – the seignorage
profit. The seignorage profit results from the return on the assets backing the outstanding stock
of currency, and these assets are the seignorage wealth. From an economic perspective,- 6 -
seignorage wealth is a net wealth of the central banks because the stock of outstanding
currency will never have to be serviced with interest payments or redemptions.3
As mentioned above, the eternal socialisation of an asset’s return is the same as the
socialisation of the asset itself. This fact enables us to base our calculations on the socialisation
of seignorage wealth rather than interest income. From a theoretical perspective there is little
difference in focusing on interest income or seignorage wealth because the latter is the present
value of the former. However, from a practical perspective the difference is large, since an
interest-based calculation would involve an estimate of the time path of the average interest
rate applicable to the assets backing the outstanding stock of currency.4 The wealth approach
avoids this difficulty. A country’s seignorage wealth equals this country’s stock of currency to
the very last cent and it is precisely equal to the present value of the interest income the
backing assets generate, even though the time path of the average rate of interest for these
assets may not be known.5
Under certain conditions, the stock of a country’s seignorage wealth is equal to its
monetary base, i.e. the sum of coins, bank notes and private accounts with the central banking
system. However, in the present context some qualifications are necessary. Before the
currency union it was a matter of debate whether the reserves that private banks are required
to hold with the central bank should be counted as part of the central banks’ seignorage
wealth. Some countries imposed large reserve requirements, others imposed low or no
requirements, some countries paid interest on the reserves held with the central bank, others
did not.6 This ambiguity has disappeared in the European currency system because the
                                                
3 In monetary theory, seignorage wealth is even considered as net wealth for the whole economy, because
the currency generates private liquidity services that outweigh the interest foregone by holding it.
4 In addition, the liquidity services of low-interest assets would have to be considered.
5 The present value of an income stream is defined as today’s market value of an asset that is able to
generate this stream. Thus the equivalence between our stock approach and a correctly specified flow
approach holds strictly, regardless of what the time paths of returns on the assets earmarked to back the
currency will be, provided the assets backing the currency are evaluated at their true market prices.
6 While France only imposed an interest-free minimum reserve requirement of between 0.5% and 1% on its
banks, and countries like Greece, Italy, Ireland and the Netherlands paid interest on the minimum reserves- 7 -
required minimum reserves with the central bank have been harmonised and the central banks
now uniformly pay interest on them. The reserve requirement is 2% of a base which consists of
time deposits with a maturity of no more than two years, of debt securities and of money
market papers. Banks are granted an interest rate which equals the average of the ECB’s rates
on the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations; this rate is currently 4.75%. The minimum
reserves therefore cannot be counted as net seignorage wealth and they are subtracted in our
calculations. Voluntary, non interest-bearing reserves in excess of the minimum reserves, on
the other hand, should be included: however, they are so small that we neglect them. We also
neglect the role of coins which, unlike the banknotes, are not included in the redistribution
mechanism and for which we have no database. Coins are a very small fraction of a country’s
monetary base.
The total amount of seignorage wealth which the 11 countries brought into the system
as of 1 January 1999, was  €  352 billion. Naturally, big countries contributed more than small
countries. This is shown in Figure 1, which relates a country’s size to the seignorage wealth
contributed.
                                                                                                                                              
held by the private banking system, Germany had a rather restrictive system. From 1950 to 1994 the
Bundesbank required that well over 10% of a bank’s demand deposits be backed by central bank money
without paying interest for it. Sinn and  Feist (1997) therefore studied the implication of alternative
harmonisation scenarios for the distribution of seignorage wealth.- 8 -
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Note: Share of ECB capital as of 1 January 1999; currency share as of 31 December 1998; AT–Austria, BE–
Belgium, FI–Finland, IR–Ireland, LU–Luxembourg, NL–Netherlands, PT–Portugal.  Sources:  European
Central Bank (1998): Key for the  ECB’s Capital, Press Release, 1 December, Frankfurt; Inter–national
Monetary Fund (2000): International Financial Statistics, March, Washington, D.C.
We measure a country’s “size” by the average of its shares in the aggregate GDP and
in the aggregate population because, by the rules of the Maastricht Treaty, this average
determines the share of the capital endowment contributed by that country. The ordinate of the
diagram thus also measures this endowment. The total capital endowment is just € 5 billion
which is tiny relative to the € 352 billion stock of interest-bearing assets contributed in the form
of seignorage wealth. It has little more than a symbolic function and serves primarily to
establish a stake in the seignorage profit.7 It does not involve any resource cost for the
contributing countries, because the interest it generates for the ECB will be distributed in
proportion to the capital endowment. The real contribution to the currency union is not the
contribution to the equity capital, but the contribution to the aggregate seignorage wealth – the
interest bearing assets which the national central banks had accumulated during their respective
histories of money creation and whose return will be socialised. The share in the equity capital
does not indicate a contribution, but a drawing right – the right to participate in the profit
                                                
7 Not even the countries’ voting power in the ECB Governing Council depends on it. While Germany, for
example, brings in 39% of seignorage wealth and has a capital share of 31%, its share of votes is 9%.- 9 -
distributions of the ECB. It determines the single country’s share in the total seignorage wealth
contributed by all countries.
Figure 1 shows that the correlation between the countries’ shares in, and contributions
to, seignorage wealth is close, but not perfect. Some countries, notably Spain and Germany,
are located below the 45º line, others like France are located above that line. Germany
contributes 39% and receives 31% of seignorage wealth, Italy contributes 18% and receives
19%, Spain contributes 14% and receives 11%, France contributes 12% and receives 21%.
Obviously, as indicated in the introduction, there is considerable redistribution of seignorage
wealth among the participating countries.
There are a number of reasons for the imbalance between country size and seignorage
wealth. First of all, the German figure is so high not only because Germany is the largest
country, but also because the  deutschmark is an important international transactions and
reserve currency, taking second place to the dollar with a foreign circulation which is worth
about € 30-40 billion.8 The fall of the Iron Curtain, the traditional strength of the German
export industries and the conservative monetary policy of the Bundesbank have all contributed
to the dominant role of the deutschmark. The high figures for the Spanish seignorage wealth
can partly be explained by the importance of the Spanish overseas connections, and partly by
the large share of the Spanish shadow economy, where cash rather than bank transfers are
used as a means of payment. According to Schneider and Ernste (2000, p.199), the Spanish
share in GDP of black market activities is about 23%, while the figure for Germany is only
14%. The low share of seignorage wealth contributed by France may be attributed to the fact
that the French Franc is not used much outside that country, and possibly also to a well-
developed banking sector and advanced payment habits.
                                                
8 Cf. Rogoff  (1998) and Seitz (1995).- 10 -
Redistribution of Seignorage Wealth through EMU
The Maastricht Treaty mandates the ECB monetary income to be shared among member
national central banks according to their respective capital key. If the capital keys happened to
match the pre-euro distribution of seignorage wealth across the European countries, there
would be no effective redistribution of seignorage wealth. In Figure 1, all countries would be
located strictly along the  ￿ 45  line. However, this is not the case. For the reasons explained, a
unit of capital carries very different amounts of seignorage wealth depending on where it
comes from.
The exact implications for the redistribution of seignorage wealth are summarised in
Table 1, which refers to the situation of 1 January 1999. Columns one and two show the
absolute and relative amounts of seignorage wealth contributed to the pool – the currency
circulation – and columns three and four show the absolute and relative amounts of seignorage
wealth received from the pool, where the latter is, as explained, given by the shares of capital
contributed which themselves reflect the population and GDP shares. The most interesting
information is contained in columns five and six. They show the absolute gains and losses of
the different countries and the respective per capita amounts.- 11 -
Table 1: Winners and Losers from the Redistribution of Seignorage Wealth
€  billion share €  billion share total, €  bn per capita, €
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Austria 12,3          3,5%        10,5        3,0%        -1,8        -222       
Belgium 12,5          3,6%        12,8        3,6%        +0,2        +24       
Finland 3,0          0,8%        6,2        1,8%        +3,3        +634       
France 43,8          12,4%        75,1        21,3%        +31,3        +535       
Germany 138,6          39,4%        109,2        31,0%        -29,3        -358       
Ireland 3,4          1,0%        3,8        1,1%        +0,4        +97       
Italy 64,5          18,3%        66,4        18,9%        +1,9        +34       
Luxembourg 0,1          0,0%        0,7        0,2%        +0,6        +1 319       
Netherlands 18,6          5,3%        19,1        5,4%        +0,5        +33       
Portugal 4,6          1,3%        8,6        2,4%        +4,0        +401       
Spain 50,7          14,4%        39,7        11,3%        -11,0        -281       
Total 352,0          100,0%        352,0        100,0%        0,0        –
Seignorage wealth contributed Gain or loss Seignorage wealth received
Note: Share of ECB capital as of 1 January 1999; currency share and population data as of 31 December
1998. Sources: European Central Bank (1998): Key for the  ECB’s Capital, Press Release, 1 December,
Frankfurt; International Monetary Fund (2000): International Financial Statistics, March, Washington,
D.C., Statistisches Bundesamt (2000): Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Ausland, Metzler-Poeschel: Stuttgart,
p. 40.
Obviously, France is the big winner and Germany the big loser of the redistribution of
seignorage wealth. While France brings in  € 43.8 billion and receives  € 75.1 billion, Germany
contributes € 139 billion and receives  € 109 billion. The French gain is  € 31.3 billion, and the
German loss is  € 29.3 billion. Without being aware of it, Germany made a net payment of
about  € 30 billion to France to be able to participate in the currency union.
In per capita terms the redistribution between the two countries is also substantial. The
average French citizen will gain  € 535, which corresponds to a sum of 3 510 francs, and the
average German citizen will lose  € 358 or 699 deutschmarks.
Next to Germany, Spain is the largest loser. In total, the Spanish losses amount
to € 11.3 billion which is  € 281 or 46 761 pesetas per capita. Austria is the only further loser
with  € 1.7 billion in total and  € 222 or 3 047 shillings per capita.- 12 -
The majority of countries are winners: Portugal, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Ireland, and Belgium, in the order of their absolute gains. A citizen of
Luxembourg gains most, with  € 1 319 or 53 211 Belgian francs, followed by a Finn with
€ 634 or 3 771 finmarks.9
To interpret these figures correctly, we repeat that they refer to the wealth equivalents
of the redistribution of that part of the seignorage profit which can be attributed to the assets
that the central banks had accumulated before 1 January 1999. There are two things which the
reader should keep in mind in order not to misinterpret our results. Firstly, the figures measure
the once-and-for all redistribution effect and do not refer to annual gains and losses. In
principle, the annual gains and losses can be calculated by multiplying the figures given in
column five of the table with a market rate of interest, but since it is not clear what the future
rate will be, such a calculation would involve a good deal of guesswork. For the reasons
explained, only a wealth-based calculation is free from such arbitrariness. Secondly, the
redistribution figures include neither the present value of future increments in seignorage wealth
that would have occurred in the course of an continued growth process had the euro not been
introduced, nor the present value of any additional future increments in seignorage wealth that
might result from a particular attractiveness of the euro as an international transactions and
reserve currency (compare the introduction, definitions 2 and 3). We do not want to argue that
these increments should not be distributed according to country size, but we want to raise the
question of whether the countries participating in the euro really wanted to enact such a
gigantic redistribution of claims on existing assets as they have done.
Additional Participants to the Eurosystem
What will happen if additional countries join the Eurosystem? In June 2000 Greece was
accepted by the EU Council as a participant of the euro area as of 1 January 2001. Will
                                                
9 Although our results are based on the superior knowledge which time has produced by now, they are
closely in line with our earlier projections as published in Sinn and Feist (1997).- 13 -
Greece gain or lose from participating in the redistribution of historic seignorage wealth, and
what will the Greek participation cost the other countries? And what about Denmark, the UK
and Sweden, should they ever wish to join? Have the Danes missed the chance of becoming
richer when they decided not to join the EMU, or have they prevented a wealth loss by not
joining?
The answers to these questions are given in Table 2, which distinguishes alternative
entrance scenarios. Columns one and two show how much a country would gain if it were the
only one to join the now-existing EMU. Columns three and four refer to a certain entrance
sequence and show how much a country would gain if it were the last to join after the
countries listed above had already joined. For example, Sweden would gain  € 2.9 billion if it
entered in addition to  Greece, Denmark and the UK and if no further country joined.
Columns five and six, finally, show how much each single country would gain if all four
candidates enter.
Table 2: Gains from Participation in the Eurosystem
total, € billion per capita, € total, € billion per capita, € total, € billion per capita, €
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Greece 2,2           209       2,2           209       1,4           137         
Denmark 2,8           524       2,7           515       2,2           409         
UK 25,8           438       25,2           428       24,8           421         
Sweden 3,8           434       2,9           330       2,9           330         
Eurosystem – – – – -31,3          -108         
Single effect All-inclusive effect Cumulative effect
Note: Share of ECB capital as of 1  January 1999; monetary, exchange rate and population data as of
31 December 1998. Sources: European Central Bank (1998): Key for the ECB’s Capital, Press Release, 1
December, Frankfurt; International Monetary Fund (2000): International Financial Statistics, March,
Washington, D.C.,  Statistisches Bundesamt (2000):  Statistisches Jahrbuch für  das  Ausland,  Metzler-
Poeschel: Stuttgart, p. 40.
The table makes it clear that all candidates for membership would indeed gain from a
participation in the redistribution of historic seignorage wealth. If all countries join, the largest- 14 -
winner both in absolute and per capita terms will be the UK. It will be able to increase its
claim on seignorage wealth by  € 25 billion, which is more than  € 400 per capita.
If Greece remains the only country to join the EMU, it will gain  € 2.2 billion in total, or
€ 209 per capita. The decision to let Greece participate thus will not only provide this country
with a stable currency but also with a considerable wealth endowment.
Had Denmark decided to join in addition to Greece  while the UK and Sweden stayed
absent, it would have gained another  € 2.7 billion in total, or  € 515 per capita. The per capita
sum is one of the largest among the winning countries. One wonders whether the Danes have
made a wise decision.
Of course, the gains depicted in Table 2 are matched by equivalent losses of the now-
existing 11 members in EMU. As we study the redistribution of a given stock of seignorage
wealth, the sum of all gains and losses resulting from a new membership is zero. Table 3
clarifies how much individual countries which are now members of the Eurosystem lose if
additional countries join.- 15 -
Table 3: Losses Due to the New Participants
total, per total, per total, per total, per
€ million capita, €  € million capita, €  € million capita, €  € million capita, € 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Austria -66     -8,1    -79     -9,8    -720   -89,2    -71     -8,8   
Belgium -80     -7,8    -96     -9,5    -874   -85,9    -86     -8,4   
Finland -39     -7,6    -47     -9,1    -426   -83,0    -42     -8,2   
France -467     -8,0    -565     -9,7    -5 134   -87,8    -505     -8,6   
Germany -680     -8,3    -822     -10,0    -7 470   -91,1    -734     -9,0   
Ireland -24     -6,5    -29     -7,8    -259   -71,0    -25     -7,0   
Italy -414     -7,2    -500     -8,7    -4 543   -79,1    -446     -7,8   
Luxembourg -4     -9,9    -5     -12,0    -46   -108,9    -4     -10,7   
Netherlands -119     -7,6    -144     -9,2    -1 305   -83,8    -128     -8,2   
Portugal -53     -5,4    -65     -6,5    -587   -59,0    -58     -5,8   
Spain -247     -6,3    -299     -7,6    -2 712   -69,0    -267     -6,8   
Greece +2 192     +209,0    -69     -6,6    -627   -59,8    -62     -5,9   
Denmark +2 719     +515,5    -510   -96,6    -50     -9,5   
UK +25 211   +428,0    -440     -7,5   
Sweden +2 917     +329,9   
Greece United Kingdom  Denmark Sweden
Note: Share of ECB capital as of 1  January 1999; monetary, exchange rate and population data as of
31 December 1998. Sources: European Central Bank (1998): Key for the ECB’s Capital, Press Release, 1
December, Frankfurt; International Monetary Fund (2000): International Financial Statistics, March,
Washington, D.C.,  Statistisches Bundesamt (2000):  Statistisches Jahrbuch für  das  Ausland,  Metzler-
Poeschel: Stuttgart, p. 40.
The first two columns  show who pays how  much for the Greek gain of  € 2.192
billion. Obviously, Germany is again the largest payer with a net contribution of  € 680 million
which increases its total loss from the currency union to almost  € 30 billion. However, the
French and Italian gains also shrink substantially by  € 467 million and  € 414 million,
respectively. This sounds large, but in fact the respective per capita numbers are small. A
German, French or Italian citizen may well be prepared to pay the € 7–8 which the Greek
membership costs.
From a purely financial perspective, all countries should be happy that Denmark has
decided not to join, for if it had done so, they would all have lost resources. Again, however,- 16 -
in per capita terms these are small numbers. Even a citizen of Luxembourg would not have lost
more than  € 12.
Most expensive would be the integration of the UK, which would cost Germany € 7.5,
France   € 5.1 and Italy  € 4.5 billion, respectively, and which would impose a burden of
between  € 80 and  € 90 on  the citizens of most countries. Finally, if Sweden joined, the
financial burden imposed on other countries would again be similar to that of Denmark.
How to Resolve the Problem
Given the magnitudes involved it is little wonder that calculations of this kind stirred up debates
in 1997, especially in the losing countries.10 As was mentioned in the introduction, the ECB
reacted to this debate by postponing the redistributive arrangements laid down primarily in
Article 32 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the
ECB for a transition period of three years.11
Redistribution of  seignorage will only take place on a large scale from 1  January 2002
onwards, when the so-called “earmarking method,” which is reflected in the calculations
presented here, will become effective.
                                                
10 The political interest in the redistribution of seignorage wealth is well documented in a query in the
German parliament (Deutscher Bundestag, 1997), in which the secretary of state at the ministry of finance
reports that the Bundesbank will stress the point in further consultations with EU central banks and urge
for a strengthening of the German position.
11 Instead of the arrangements described in the Protocol, an auxiliary redistribution method was agreed on
for the transition period. According to this method, the monetary income to be distributed among the
central banks is determined indirectly (hence the term “indirect method”) by simply multiplying a specified
reference rate of interest with a defined liability base of the ECB. The reference rate of interest is equal to
the interest rate of main refinancing operations, and the defined liability base consists of current accounts,
deposit facilities, fixed term deposits, fine-tuning reserve operations and deposits related to margin calls.
The assets backing the banknotes in circulation were deliberately excluded from the liability base in order
to postpone the effective redistribution mechanism. For a similar reason, interest paid by national central
banks on items within the liability base is deductible and only the net income is pooled. Since minimum
reserve requirement deposits which constitute the bulk of the so-defined liability base are remunerated at
the Eurosystem’s main refinancing rate, the order of magnitude of the income eligible for redistribution
turned out to be very small (about €  35 million). In fact, the income calculated this way was not even
enough to cover the ECB’s operating cost such that, in 1999, the ECB had to charge its member banks a
fee of  € 184.6 million in total (cf. European Central Bank, 2000).- 17 -
There is, however, a second transition period which is foreseen in Article 51 of the
Protocol. According to this article, the ECB Governing Council has the right to exempt certain
fractions of national seignorage income from redistribution for a period of five years. In the first
year, at least 40% of the seignorage has to be redistributed according to the capital keys, and
with each consecutive year this percentage has to increase by at least 12 percentage points so
that the full socialisation of historic seignorage wealth will be completed by the end of the fifth
year at the latest. If the Council sticks to its current timetable and then makes use of this
provision, this will be 1 January 2007.
What can be done about the situation? Roesl and Schaefer (2000) argue that the
central banks of the disadvantaged countries could be given the right to reduce their interest
contributions to the pool by earmarking low interest assets to their monetary bases. At first
sight this seems to be a possible solution. However, the proposal neglects the fact that in
EMU, a single country has little incentive to hold liquid, low interest-bearing assets. If it holds
such assets, it does so for the benefit of the whole system in terms of providing the necessary
flexibility for open market operations. Suppose, starting from a situation where all countries
hold high-interest assets,  the ECB asks a particular central bank to exchange their assets
against  liquid, low-interest assets in order to be able to gain more  flexibility for market
operations. This exchange reduces the interest income of the central bank and its interest
contribution to the pool, while more liquidity services are available to the system. According to
their size, all countries participate in the interest loss and in the liquidity services. A national
gain, which could mitigate the disadvantages of the loser countries, will not result from this
asset exchange.
Another suggestion was made by Sinn and  Feist (1997) and supported by  Gros
(1998). Its essence was to allocate the  initial equity contributions in proportion to the
magnitudes of the respective monetary bases as of 1 January 1999 and the  additional
contributions necessitated by a future growth in the joint monetary base in proportion to
country size. This suggestion implies that historic seignorage wealth is exempt from
redistribution, but that the increments in seignorage wealth due to the normal growth of the- 18 -
European economies and due to any extraordinary success of the euro are shared equally
according to country size (see definitions 2 and 3 of the introduction).
Such a rule would probably require an amendment to the Maastricht Treaty. Given
that the redistribution clauses in the treaty were not understood by the signing parties, this
amendment should be agreeable to the member countries.
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